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EMINENT DOMAIN-Valuation-Navigational Servitude-Effect on Evaluation
of Port Site Property. United States v. Rands, 88 S.Ct. 265 (1967).

R. B. Rands owned land along the Columbia River, about
six miles upstream from the present John Day Dam. In
1962 the land was leased to the State of Oregon with an option
to purchase, "it apparently being contemplated that the state
would use the land as an industrial park, part of which would
function as a port."' Most of the land was priced, under the
option, at $150 per acre; the balance, designated "port side
property" in the agreement, was priced at $400 per acre. The
option was never exercised, for the United States condemned
the property in 1963 for a river development project.
In the condemnation action, the trial court determined
that the compensable value of the land taken was limited to
its value for sand, gravel, and agriculture purposes and that
its special value as a port site was not compensable under
the Fifth Amendment. This decision was subsequently reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit by distinguishing between "power site" and "port
site," the former and not the latter falling within the navigational servitude doctrine.'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
because the Ninth Circuit decision seemed to be in conflict
with United States v. Twin City Power Co.' In reversing
the Ninth Circuit decision, Justice White stated that "as was
true in Twin City, if an owner of the fast lands can demand
port site value as part of his compensation, 'he gets the value
of a right that the Government in the exercise of its dominant
servitude can grant or withhold as it chooses. To require the
United States to pay for this value would be to create private
claims in the public domain.' "4 Thus, in a decision based on
the logic of habit rather than reason, the Supreme Court once
again held that in the area of navigable waters, exceptions
are made to the requirement that just compensation be made
for public interference with private property.
1.
2.
3.
4.

United States v. Rands, 88 S. Ct. 265, 266 (1967).
Rands v. United States, 367 F.2d 186, 191 (9th Cir. 1966).
United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
United States v. Rands, supra note 1, at 268. The logic behind this statement is based on the concept "that the running water in a navigable stream
is capable of private ownership is inconceivable." United States v. ChandlerDunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69 (1913).
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The power of the United States to regulate and control
navigable waters arises from the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution.' Under this clause, the government interest in
navigable waters supersedes the property rights of the individual landowner, and in effect, makes the general rule
applied in condemnation proceedings under the fifth amendment inapplicable to this type of condemnation.' However,
this rule was not followed in the first condemnation case to
reach the court, in which the United States was required to
pay for the value of a toll-collecting franchise in the Monogahela River.' Under the Commerce Clause the United States
was said to have had the power to appropriate the owner's
locks and dam, but the power was "subject to the limitations
imposed by the fifth amendment, that private property shall
not be taken for public uses without just compensation .... "'
Although the Ninth Circuit Court held that the principles
of Monogahela were applicable, 9 the court has generally followed the Supreme Court's contention that the case does not
fall within the no-compensation rule because the court decided
the case on estoppel principles."0
The more predominant group of cases, however, follow
the navigational servitude doctrine as discussed in United
States v. Chandler-DunbarWater Power Co." when ascertaining the compensable value of fast lands.1 2 In that case the
United States sought to condemn the land of four power
companies for the expansion of the Sault Sainte Marie ship
canals. The Supreme Court held that the riparian"3 owner
has no right to compensation for the value of its fast lands
attributable to its suitability for use as a power site. To
justify the opinion, the court said that "the Government
cannot be justly required to pay for an element of value which
did not inhere in these parcels as uplands. The Government
had dominion over the water power of the rapids and falls
§ 8.
United States v. Chicago, M., St. P.&P.R.Co., 312 U.S. 592, 597 (1941).
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
Id. at 845.
Rands v. United States, supra note 2, at 192.
Greenleaf Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251, 264 (1915); Omnia
Commercial Co. Inc. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 513-14 (1923).
11. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., supra note 4.
12. Fast land is land above the high-water mark.
13. This article will use the word riparian only as reference to the relationship
of land to water, that is, it will be used to describe land that is adjacent
to water.
5. U.S. CONST. art. 1,

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol4/iss1/10
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and cannot be required to pay any hypothetical additional
value to a riparian owner who had no right to appropriate
the current to his own commercial use.'"" This has been the
controlling principle in the evaluation of riparian fast land
since the case was decided in 1913.
Because of an internal inconsistency" in the logic of the
Chandler-DunbarCourt, noticeable inroads on the servitude
concept were made in FPC v. NiagaraMohawk Power Corp.1"
and United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co. 7 Although
neither case involved the evaluation of fast lands, the decisions are relevant in that the court refused to rely on the
proprietary nature of the federal navigation power where
the Government's act interfered with the property of individuals. In the Niagara Power case the court held that the
Federal Power Act had not destroyed state recognized
usufructuary rights in the flow of the river and the United
States could be compelled to pay for these rights. The Kansas
City Life Ins. case held that since the privilege of servitude
only incompasses the exercise of the federal power with
respect to the stream itself and the lands beneath and within
its highwater mark, the Government must compensate for
any taking of fast lands which result from the exercise of
this power.
This departure from the strict servitude doctrine of the
Chandler-Dunbwrcase is best illustrated by Justice Douglas'
dissents in both opinions. In the Niagara Power Corp. case
he stated that "the Federal Power Act should not be construed as requiring the United States to pay for something
it already owns." 8 And in Kansas City Life Ins. Co. he commented that "it would be incongruous to deny compensation
to owners adjacent to navigable rivers and require it for
others bordering their tributaries for like inj'uries caused by
the single act of lifting the river's mean level to the highwater mark." 9 Justice Douglas' opinion finally prevailed
in a 5-4 decision in United States v. Twin City Power Co.2"
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., eupra note 4, at 76.
The Court denied compensation for any additional value derived from the
hydro-electrical potential of the fall of the river, yet the Government was
required to pay for the availability of land for lock and canal purposes.
FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239 (1954).
United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950).
FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., supra note 16, at 259.
United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., supra note 17, at 812.
United States v. Twin City Power Co., supra note 3, at 229.
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In that case the United States condemned a promising site
for a hydro-electric power plant and was held to be under
no obligation to pay for any special value which the fast
lands had for power generating purposes. Consequently, the
servitude doctrine established by the Chandler-DunbarCourt
was solidified by Justice Douglas when he distinguished Kansas City Life Ins. Co. and NiagaraPower Corp. by stating:
The flaw in that reasoning is that the landowner
here seeks a value in the flow of the stream, a value
that inheres in the Government's servitude and one
that under our decisions the Government can grant
or withhold as it chooses. It is no answer to say that
payment is sought only for the location value of the
fast lands. That special location value is due to the
flow of the stream; and if the United States were
required to pay the judgments below, it would be
compensating the landowner for the increment of
value added to the fast lands if the flow of the stream
were taken into account."'
The Ninth Circuit Court attempted to avoid the Twin
City holding by contending that power site value and port
site value are distinguishable.22 However, this is not true, for
as was stated in the Supreme Court opinion, "in both cases,
special value arises from access to, and use of, navigable
waters. With regard to the Constitutional duty to compensate
a riparian owner, no distinction can be drawn. 2 Although
the Supreme Court's decision is correct from a traditional
standpoint, the basic conceptual justification for the nocompensation rule is subject to question.
The court has generally permitted the government to take
a riparian owner's land without compensation for one of two
reasons: (1) To hold that no property right is being taken,
but only a public right for which there is no compensation
or (2) The government is exercising its paramount navigational power to which the riparian land has always been
subject. It has been suggested that "the primary determination is one of property rights. It is self-evident that all property rights possessed by the United States cannot be private
21. Id. at 225-26.
22. Although there have been several "power site" cases, it is important to
note that the Rands case was the first case to decide the question as to
whether "port site" value was compensable under the fifth amendment.
23. United States v. Rands, supra note 1, at 268.
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property, and that the exercise of these rights does not involve
loss to any owner." 4 Consequently, in order to show a compensable injury, the riparian owner must possess property
rights unburdened by the servitude, for rights that are burdened are not legally protected. 5 The Supreme Court in the
Rands case evidently utilizes this logic when it states that
"these rights and values . . . are not property within the

meaning of the Fifth Amendment and need not be paid for
when appropriated by the United States." 2" (Emphasis added). This analysis, however, does not indicate the basis for
such property right in the United States. Consequently, this
logic is questionable for as "no one would suggest that Congress has a latent property interest in all level ground such
as would permit condemnation of land for a military airport
without compensation,... it seems illogical to find that power

to control navigation gives the government an inherent property interest in rivers.""
The other reason most often given by the court in denying compensation for property taken from riparian owners
is that "when the United States appropriates the flow either
of navigable or a nonnavigable stream pursuant to its superior
power under the Commerce Clause, it is exercising established prerogatives and is beholden to no one." 2 The court
also utilizes this argument in the instant case in denying any
compensation for port site value. Justice White states that
the exercise of the superior power of the United States is not
an invasion of private property rights in the stream "for the
damage sustained does not result from taking property from
riparian owners within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment
but from the lawful exercise of a power to which the interests
of riparian owners have always been subject."" 9 However,
the fallacy in this argument is that all powers of the Federal
24. Powell, Just Compensation And The Navigation Power, 31 WASH. L. REV.
271 (1956).
25. See United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., supra note 4, at
76 in which the Court utilizes this logic by stating: "Having decided that
the Chandler-Dunbar Company as riparian owners had no such vested
property right in the water power inherent in the falls and rapids of the
river, and no right to place in the river the works essential to any practical
use of the flow of the river, the Government cannot be justly required to
pay for an element of value which did not inhere in these parcels as upland."
26. United States v. Rands, aupra note 1, at 268.
27. Lynch,, Constitutional Law-Eminent Domain-Condemnation of Riparian
Lands Under The Commerce Power, 55 MiCH. L. REv. 272, 275 (1956).
28. United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229, 233 (1960).
29. United States v. Rands, supra note 1, at 267.
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Government are superior in that they are capable of preempting state legislation. Therefore, the states as well as
the people are subject to the superior power of the United
States. By the same reasoning, all titles to private property
can be said to be qualified because all such titles can be subordinated to the superior federal power in areas where the
National Government has the power to become active. From
this logic, however, it does not follow that the owner of the
potentially subordinate title is not entitled to compensation
when it is taken by condemnation." The fact of subordination
of private water rights to the public right of navigation does
not explain their non-compensability, for the very same right
would be compensable if the Government destroyed them in
the exercise of a different, but equally superior right."'
The court has traditionally justified the exercise of its
navigational power by alluding to a "notice theory." Under
this theory, "all who make use of navigable waterways presumably 'know' that any rights they may acquire are subject
to destruction without compensation. Therefore, they make
investments at their own risk and cannot reasonably expect
to be protected.""2 The fallacy in this logic is that it fails
to take into account two pertinent developments. "One is the
constitutionally sanctioned increase in federal activity under
the navigation power under its humble beginnings in Gibbons
v. Ogden. The other is the expansion of the word 'navigable. ' ,,3
From 1900 to 1940 the Government utilized the Gibbons
v. Ogden 4 decision to expand the servitude doctrine into the
areas of flood control, 5 hydro-electric power projects,""
reclamation,"' and navigation improvements. 8 And from the
30. Morreale, Federal Power In Western Waters: The Navigation Power And
The Rule Of No Compensation, 3 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 1, 23 (1963).
31. See International Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399 (1931). In this
case the Court required the Government to compensate a power company
for the taking of electrical power in the exercise of the Government's war
power.
32. Morreale, Federal Power In Western Waters: The Navigation Power And
The Rule O No Compensation, 3 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 1, 23 (1963).
33. Id. at 24.
34. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
35. Jackson v. United States, 230 U.S. 1, 23 (1913).
36. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., supra note 4, at 78.
See also Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 456 (1931).
37. Burley v. United States, 179 F. 1, 11 (9th Cir 1910).
38. United States v. Appalaclan Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407 (1940).
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Chandler-Dunbardecision in 1913 until the United States v.
Grand River Dam Authority" ' opinion in 1960, there has
been a gradual expansion of the word "navigable" to a point
where most any stream now is capable of falling within the
servitude doctrine. Because of this expansion of the servitude
power and the word navigable, one writer has suggested that:
"When the court permits federal control over nonnavigable
as well as navigable waters in the exercise of dominant servitude, and the Government is not required to pay for water
power loss . . . it then becomes necessary to question the

interpretation under which this result was achieved." 4
Any discussion concerning the policy factor behind the
rule must begin with the statement by the court in the Monongoheta Navigation Co. case: "The question presented is not
whether the United States has the power to condemn and
appropriate this property ...

but how much it must pay as

compensation therefor."" The policy of the court since 1913
seems to be that since the nation's waterways are the property
of all the people, and they have been entrusted to Congress
under the Commerce Clause, "Congress should be free to
develop their potential for the benefit of all the people without having to 'pay private claims in the public domain.' ,,12
This was possibly a valid policy consideration during the first
half of this century. However, it is submitted that this policy
is not appropriate today and that the Court should consider
the proposition that when the public benefits, the public should
pay. The control of government spending is one of the most
effective methods of keeping the government under control.
When government power is as broad as the navigational servitude power has become, political pressure on public spending
is particularily important. Consequently, "the more of the
cost of a new federal project which is placed on the many
rather than the few, the more sensitive is political reaction,
and the broader the effective base of political decision.'
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, supra note 28, at 233. In
this case the Court held that the Government could exercise its navigational
servitude powers in nonnavigable as well as navigable streams.
Baldwin, The Impact Of The Commerce Clause On The Riparian Rights
Doctrine, 16 U. FLA. L. REv. 370, 406-07 (1963).
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, supra note 7, at 324.
Compensable Values in Federal "Taking" of Damsites, 14 STAN. L. REv.
800, 809 (1962). See also United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339
U.S. 725, 738 (1950).
Id. at 810.
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According to a recent American Bar Association Committee on public regulation of land use, owners of riparian
property were reluctant to develop their land because of an
ever-present fear that their property would be lost through
the Government's exercise of its navigational servitude power.
Therefore, they recommended legislative action to restrict
navigational servitude as a deterrent to the development of
riparian lands.4" To support this proposal the committee
stated that:
"Navigation servitude" has inhibited the development of waterfront areas over navigable waters by
private enterprise, because the right of the sovereign
to take in eminent domain without compensation
creates a hazard to financing which makes the development of such projects difficult from a practical
point of view. Title companies generally list this
right as an exception in policies of title insurance
which has the effect of rendering the property largely unmortgageable."
Decisions such as the Rands case only serve to expand the
doctrine of navigational servitude, which has the adverse
effect of deterring private riparian development.
This is not to suggest that the servitude doctrine should
be discarded and all cases which were spawned from the
Chandler-Dunbar decision should be reversed. On the contrary, navigational servitude is a valid doctrine which should
be retained. However, in recent years there has been a liberal
trend in eminent domain law. Consequently, the policy of the
Court has been to give aid to landowners by liberally applying
the compensatory provisions of the constitutions and statutes. 6 By widening the navigational servitude doctrine, the
court in the Rands case is acting inconsistently with this trend.
44. A.B.A. Comm. On Public Regulation Of Land Use, Report: A Model Land
Use Code-The Navigation Servitude, 2 ABA SECT. REAL PioP. L. 597,
597-600 (1967).
45. Id. at 597.
46. In recent years the court has allowed compensation to property owners in
eminent domain proceedings by liberally construing the requirement of a
"physical taking". See Pope v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 36 (N.D. Tex.
1959). In this case the United States was required to pay just compensation
for the taking of a flight easement. See also Kimball Laundry Co. v. United
States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949). In this case the Supreme Court held that the
Government must compensate the owner for the loss of his trade routes
while the military was using his business facilities. This is particularly
significant in that the owner received the compensation although the routes
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Even if one accepts the Supreme Court's broad definition
of the navigation power, compensation for port site value
could be granted under an expanded inverse condemnation
theory. 7 If this theory were used the court would not have
to make a black-or-white choice between navigational servitude and eminent domain theories in reaching their conclusion.
Such a choice requires complete denial or grant of compensation without regard to the particular exigencies of the case,
which often results in either an undue windfall or an unjust
compensation award for the taking of riparian land. Under
an expanded inverse condemnation theory, compensation could
be awarded in situations like the Rands case on the basis of
the particular facts of the case. Such a policy would give the
court the latitude of allowing the riparian owner compensation for taking his property under eminent domain principles,
while maintaining the government's right to condemn the
land by exercising navigational servitude concepts.
KENNETH L. KEENE
were not formally "taken". The liberal trend is further illustrated by the
new legal terms which the change in the court's attitude has spawned, i.e.,
condemnation by nuisance. Stoebuck, Condemnation By Nuisance: The
Airport Casee In Retrospect And Prospect, 71 DIcK L. REV. 207 (1967).
47. "Inverse condemnation is the popular description of a cause of action
against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property which
has been taken in fact by the government defendant, even though no formal
exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking
agency." Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 180, 376 P.2d 100,
101 n.1 (1962).
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